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Abstract  
 
Depending on which kind of philosophy of science we espouse, health 
psychology can be a relatively concrete or relatively abstract activity. Estacio, 
I suggest, prioritises the concrete, by foregrounding real social phenomena. I 
argue that prioritising the concrete has two particular benefits: it increases the 
social relevance of health psychology, and it increases the validity of our 
analyses, by ensuring that they are close to reality. To further the pursuit of 
the concrete, I suggest that critical health psychology is in particular need of 
exemplars of critical health psychology in action, rather than reflexive 
commentary on critical health psychology itself.  
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Emee Estacio’s article (this issue) begins from a real, politically problematic 
social event with health implications, namely a racialising comedy sketch, and 
from this event, draws out social issues for research. While the details of 
these activities are interesting and important, Estacio’s article has stimulated 
me to reflect upon wider questions of the kind of philosophy of science being 
enacted here, and the kinds of contributions needed for a critical health 
psychology. In this commentary, I wish to situate Estacio’s approach as an 
instance of a concrete health psychology, which, distinctively, begins with 
ongoing human experience and activity, rather than with abstract theoretical 
or experimental preoccupations. In so doing, I aim to promote an activity-
focused, societally-relevant health psychology, and to point to the kind of 
research contribution required to further that interest.  
Concrete vs. abstract ways of doing science 
The impetus for Estacio’s paper is striking in a Psychology journal – what 
place has a comedy sketch in an academic paper? Is it not far removed from 
the serious, distanced, specialised debates with which prestigious academic 
work concerns itself? Moreover, the paper’s primary concern is with concrete 
issues of racism, exploitation and migration, not with a recognised 
psychological phenomenon or theory. Estacio’s prioritisation of real world 
phenomena is what is most distinctive and exciting for me about her paper. 
This approach is somewhat unsettling for the dominant psychological 
preoccupations with empirical findings about psychological variables, or 
formal psychological theories (Tolman, 1999). Taking practical human activity 
(such as the creation of media comedies, the exploitative practices of 
employers of insecure underpaid domestic workers, or collective action to 
  
redress inequalities) as our material and as the measure of our success is 
what I call a concrete health psychology. Taking psychological constructs 
(such as attitudes, self-esteem, mental health) and the relations between 
them to be our preoccupation, is, by contrast, an abstract health psychology.  
 
The activity-focused philosophy of science which I advocate is the kind of 
approach suggested by Marx’s (1845) early philosophical writings, and the 
development of his tradition in cultural-historical activity theory (e.g. Chaiklin, 
1996), and by historical and contemporary pragmatism (James, 1907/ 1995; 
Rorty, 1999), among others. Common to both these traditions is a 
prioritisation of concrete practical human activities, and a de-valuing of 
abstract, idealist theorising or researching. In what follows I will use 
pragmatist arguments, though a Marxist or cultural-historical activity theory 
line of thinking could equally be used to make similar claims.  
 
According to pragmatism, the core and undeniable material for philosophical 
and scientific endeavour is ongoing concrete human activity. While, after 
postmodernism, we may not be confident that we are reaching ultimate 
objective truths about the universe, or ideas which are so theoretically elegant 
as to be unassailable, according to pragmatism, what we can be sure of is 
concrete human activity and experience (Cornish & Gillespie, under review). If 
a person says that they are suffering, there is no reason or purpose in 
doubting their statement. An institutional practice which discriminates between 
people on the basis of their skin colour is an oppressive practice which can be 
observed and changed. A collective protest about a racialising television piece 
  
is an effort at social change with public effects. I use the phrase “real with a 
small ‘r’” in my title, to say that these things are real, not in a Realist sense of 
being part of an ultimate and undeniable Reality, but in a more modest sense 
of being a concrete practical event that stands up to our efforts to understand 
or change it, and which there is no point in denying.  
 
Abstract ways of working are more common in health psychology, exemplified 
by a focus on psychological constructs such as self-esteem, intelligence, 
motivation or intention, and on examination of statistical associations between 
variables (e.g. Tolman, 1999; Cornish, 2004). A realist philosophy of science 
claims that such constructs reflect an underlying reality and that science is an 
attempt to come ever closer to that underlying reality. An idealist or rationalist 
philosophy of science takes the constructs themselves as the object of 
interest, and values the elegance of theories. According to pragmatists, such 
abstractions risk lifting off from the reality of activity, to an ideal realm where 
concepts refer mainly to each other, and their concrete meaning in terms of 
real human activity is negligible if it can be observed at all. Concrete cases of 
oppression, inequality, pain and suffering are real, undeniable and urgent in 
ways that abstract concepts such as self-efficacy, psychological 
empowerment or the class system are not.  
 
This philosophy problematises the traditional hierarchical distinction between 
basic research and applied research. Researching concrete problems is not 
an activity of ‘applying’ theories derived from controlled experiments to a real-
world context. Rather, it is an activity of studying real-world phenomena and 
  
developing and using theories to the extent that they demonstrably facilitate 
actionable understandings of those phenomena. Their primary test is in 
reality, not in the laboratory.  
 
There are both political and intellectual arguments for taking a concrete 
approach. Politically, the major benefit of prioritising the concrete is that it 
ensures the social relevance of our work. It focuses our attention on real, 
urgent problematic issues in our societies, and increases the likelihood that 
we will contribute to transforming or improving problematic social situations. 
Intellectually, the pragmatist position argues that we will produce better 
knowledge – knowledge that is more valid, more actionable, more meaningful 
and more useful – if we take concrete activity as the core of our work. 
Problems of external validity of how our constructs relate to the world are 
minimised when our primary material is the real world.  
 
If health psychology is to contribute to understanding and action on real social 
problems, I suggest that it needs to give these problems the status of its 
primary material. From this point of view, Estacio’s impetus is in the right 
direction for a productive health psychology.  
The place of theory in a concrete health psychology  
While pragmatism prioritises the concrete, this is not to say that it is anti-
intellectualist or empiricist, or naively activist, de-valuing theorising and 
reflecting. Theories are important, but not as statements that uncover or 
reflect reality in itself. They are useful in a much more practical sense, in so 
far as they enable us to conceptualise and act on reality in new and desirable 
  
ways (Mead, 1936; Rorty, 1999). Theories enable us to step out of the 
immediacies of ongoing activity, to conceptualise the activity, revealing, for 
instance, how it is oppressive or ineffective, and how it might be improved. It 
is in this role, I suggest, that Estacio places her recommended theoretical 
traditions. Theories of discourse facilitate our reflection on the use of 
language in our societies and how it may oppress, discriminate, open up or 
close down certain kinds of action. Theories of participation and collective 
action facilitate reflection on means of promoting grassroots movements for 
health-enabling social change. These theories are tools for opening up the 
issues to analysis and action, and they are useful in so far as they stimulate 
fruitful action.  
 
We can describe our activity, then, as having both action and reflection 
phases, each as important as the other. Paulo Freire (1970), whose work has 
inspired much community health psychology on collective action, writes of a 
reflection-action dialectic. Reflection and action are two interdependent 
phases of critical praxis. Without action, reflective (or theoretical) work risks 
becoming empty ‘blah’, meaningless discourse that refers, ineffectually only to 
itself. But without reflection, action may become mere ‘activism’, which risks 
having pernicious uncritical effects, if it is devoid of the critical self-awareness 
of strengths, weaknesses and complexities which are enabled by a careful 
reflective phase. A dialectic between reflection and action, is, according to 
Freire, what enables us to enact a critical emancipatory project. 
  
Scientific contributions as action vs. reflection  
We can use this distinction between action and reflection to think about 
different types of contributions within health psychology, and this is the 
second form of concreteness that I wish to discuss. We can distinguish 
between academic contributions that ‘do’ critical health psychology, and 
contributions that reflect on critical health psychology. ‘Doing’ critical health 
psychology includes initiating health-enhancing social action, but it also 
includes providing analyses which open up the social world enabling new, 
critical, transformative interpretations and actions. Two examples may 
illustrate what I mean by ‘doing’ critical health psychology.  
 
Catherine Campbell and her colleagues, in collaboration with poor 
communities in southern Africa, are working to promote and to understand 
effective and valued local responses to HIV/AIDS. They are showing that poor 
communities can make a difference, with appropriate supports from more 
powerful groups. In so doing, they are ‘doing’ critical health psychology, and 
demonstrating its value to addressing some of the most difficult and important 
public health problems. Another example is provided by the work of the 
London-based Service User Research Enterprise (SURE), which strives to put 
forward the voices of mental health service users within the research context 
(Rose, 2008). For instance, SURE has conducted a ‘patient-centred 
systematic review’ of electroconvulsive therapy which reviewed service users’ 
experiences of the treatment revealing important disjunctions between users’ 
views and accepted psychiatric understandings and stimulating some 
controversy (Rose, Wykes, Leese, Bindman & Fleischmann, 2003).  
  
 
On the other hand, there is another set of papers which do not ‘do’ critical 
health psychology, but which reflect upon it. Contributions which explicitly 
position themselves in terms of ‘critical health psychology’ often function at a 
reflective level, for instance, laying out research agendas for critical health 
psychology (e.g. Estacio, this issue; Marks, 2002), critiquing the mainstream 
literature (e.g. Crossley, 2001), or critiquing critical health psychology itself 
(Stam, 2000). For such work, rather than the social world being the object of 
analysis, it is health psychology, or indeed critical health psychology that is 
the object of attention. While this reflexive phase of the critical project is 
crucial to emancipating us from the usual, taken-for-granted ways of thinking 
and acting, it is not alone sufficient. As Hepworth (2006) and Prilleltensky 
(2004) have argued, critical health psychology has perhaps over-emphasised 
the work of critiquing other approaches, to the neglect of establishing its own 
productive alternative ways of practising health psychology. From a 
pragmatist perspective, the proof of the value of ideas is in their practical 
consequences for action.  
 
As an activity of ‘calling for further research’, Estacio’s paper is in the genre of 
reflections on critical health psychology. The most convincing way of 
demonstrating that the suggested avenues of research should be pursued 
would be to put them into practice and show how productive they are. While 
Estacio’s paper is concrete in its focus on real world issues, it is less concrete 
in what it achieves.  
 
  
We need exemplars of critical health psychology in action for at least three 
reasons. The first is to meet the critical health psychology interest in making a 
contribution to health-enhancing transformative action. We need to do critical 
health psychology, to put it into practice, or our reflections risk becoming 
‘empty blah’. Secondly, to make its mark, critical health psychology needs to 
demonstrate to other disciplines and professions the valuable difference that 
its perspective makes to tackling key problems (MacLachlan, 2006; Vinck & 
Meganck, 2006). Thirdly, for our development of expertise as critical health 
psychologists, and for the education of students, detailed case studies 
exemplifying critical work in action are needed, to develop familiarity with the 
nuts and bolts and the complexities of working in real social settings.  
Let’s get real  
A focus on the concrete is a challenge to health psychology to make clear its 
implications for real human activities in which health is supported or 
undermined. I have argued for the value of concrete health psychology 
research, both in terms of focusing on concrete problems, and in terms of 
providing concrete exemplars. It is not always easy to keep the focus on the 
concrete, but if we want to do so, we can start by asking ourselves the simple 
but infuriatingly difficult question: “so what”?  
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